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Digest: In re Adoption of Joshua S. 
Ryan Odenwalder 
Opinion by Moreno, J ., expressing the unanimous view of the Court. 
Issue 
Can attorney's fees under California Code of Civil Procedure section 
1021.5 be imposed on a party who has adversely affected the public interest 
only by raising an issue during litigation over private rights from which 
important appellate precedent happens to emerge? 
Facts 
Sharon and Annette had been in a committed relationship since 1989. 1 
In 1996 and 1999, Sharon was artificially inseminated and gave birth to 
Zachary and Joshua, respectively.2 Sharon consented to Annette adopting 
both children while Sharon retained her parental rights. 3 Thereafter, Sha-
ron and Annette ended their relationship and Annette left the family home.4 
Annette moved for an order of adoption, while Sharon moved for court ap-
proval to withdraw her consent to adopt and to dismiss Annette's petition 
on the grounds that the adoption Annette sought was unlawful. 5 
The trial court denied Sharon's motion to dismiss the adoption.6 Sha-
ron sought a writ of mandate, which the Court of Appeal granted.7 Annette 
used the services of attorney, Charles Bird to represent her in these pro-
ceedings. 8 Bird told Annette that oral argument at the Court of Appeal 
would cost between eight and ten thousand dollars and that further litiga-
tion, if she lost there, would cost more than she could pay.9 But he agreed 
to represent her because he was concerned for the precedent set by the case 
and because of the possibility of recovering attorney fees based on the 
"public benefit resulting from the work." 10 
1 In re Adoption of Joshua S., 174 P.3d 192, 194 (Cal. 2008). 
2 !d. 
3 !d. 
4 !d. 
5 !d. 
6 !d. 
7 !d. 
8 !d. 
9 !d. at 195. 
10 !d. 
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.. 
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The Court of Appeal found the adoption had no statutory basis. 11 An-
nette appealed to the California Supreme Court, which found the sought-
after adoption lawful but remanded for resolution of factual findings. 12 
Before the factual issues were resolved, Annette moved the court to 
award her $138,939.78 in attorney's fees, pursuant to California Code of 
Civil Procedure section I 021.5Y The trial court awarded $92,049.15 in 
attorney's fees because the California Supreme Court's decision positively 
conferred a nonpecuniary benefit to a class of people and resolved an im-
portant issue of law. 14 The Court of Appeal reversed, reasoning that An-
nette's personal stake in the outcome of the case, her adoptive rights, out-
weighed the cost of the litigation. 15 The California Supreme Court granted 
review. 16 
Analysis 
Section I 021.5 permits an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party when: (I) the plaintiffs action results in the enforcement of an im-
portant right that affects the public interest; (2) a significant benefit is con-
ferred to the general public or a large class of people; and (3) the necessity 
and financial burden of private enforcement would make the award appro-
priate.17 The third factor has been interpreted to mean that the need to pur-
sue the lawsuit caused the plaintiff a financial burden out of proportion 
with his or her personal stake in the matter. 18 The courts normally compare 
"the expected value of the litigation at the time it was commenced with the 
costs oflitigation."19 
The Court found that the litigation met the first two prongs, estimating 
that ten to twenty thousand second parent adoptions would have been jeo-
pardized by the Court of Appeal's invalidation of them. 20 When it turned 
to the third prong, however, it found that Annette's interest in the case was 
immeasurable, and, therefore, it would be difficult to compare its value 
with the cost of the litigation.21 
Annette argued that a plaintiff in such situation automatically met the 
third requirement as a matter of law.22 Citing several appellate court opi-
nions, Sharon argued that nonpecuniary interests did not automatically 
11 /d. 
12 !d. at 194. 
13 /d. 
14 /d. at 195. 
15 !d. 
16 /d. at 195, 200. 
17 /d. at 195 (citing Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n., Inc. v. City Council, 593 P.2d 200 (Cal. 
1979)). 
18 /d. (citing Woodland Hills Residents Ass'n., Inc. v. City Council, 593 P.2d 200 (Cal. 1979)). 
19 !d. (citing Los Angeles Police Protective League v. City of Los Angeles, 232 Cal. Rptr. 697 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986)). 
20 /d. 
21 /d. at 196. 
22 /d. 
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qualify a plaintiff for attorney's fees. 23 The Court observed that, even if 
Annette's argument was incorrect, the trial court was not necessarily wrong 
to decide that she qualified for attorney's fees if their cost outweighed their 
nonpecuniary benefit. 24 Reframing the issue, the Court decided not to an-
swer whether the trial court abused its discretion on the balancing issue, but 
instead reviewed whether Sharon was the type of party against whom the 
statute intended to impose payment of attorney's fees. 25 
Sharon contended she should not have to pay attorney's fees simply 
because her litigation to adjudicate her private rights happened to result in 
an appellate precedent potentially compromising the rights of a class of 
people.26 The Court agreedY The Court noted that Section 1021.5 was an 
exception to the rule that parties to a lawsuit normally pay their own attor-
ney's fees. 28 The Court acknowledged that the reason for this exception 
was not expressly articulated, but that it seemed to justify imposing "public 
interest attorney fees on parties that have done something to adversely af-
fect the public interest."29 The Court noted that all twenty of its former 
published opinions in which attorney's fees had been awarded under Sec-
tion 1021.5 involved a defendant whose behavior impaired the rights of the 
public or a significant class of people. 30 
The Court noted that language of the statute permits attorney's fees re-
sulting in the "enforcement" of rightsY From this language, the Court 
said, a defendant must infringe on a person's rights to require enforcement 
of these rights through litigation.32 The Court then looked to the legislative 
history. 33 The Senate documents stated that the statute was intended to 
award attorney's fees in "public interest litigation."34 The Court interpreted 
this language as "enforcing laws that a governmental or private entity was 
violating, rather than private litigation that happened to establish an impor-
tant precedent."35 Finally, the Court stated that it formerly held that Sec-
tion 1021.5 did not apply against a defendant when another person was 
more responsible for the actions or policies that gave rise to the litigation.36 
The Court clarified that it was not holding that mere involvement in 
litigation alone could always bar a Section 1021.5 claim. 37 The Court said 
23 /d. 
24 !d. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. at 196-97. 
27 !d. at 197. 
28 !d. 
29 !d. 
30 !d. at 197. 
31 !d. at 198. 
32 /d. 
33 /d. 
34 !d. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted). 
35 /d. 
36 !d. at 198-99 (citing Connerly v. State Personnel Bd., 129 P.3d I (Cal. 2006)). 
37 !d. at 199. 
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that, if the defendant initiates litigation that is determined to adversely af-
fect the public interest, the litigation alone could warrant a claim for attor-
ney's fees. 38 The Court differentiated this situation from Sharon's, howev-
er, because she had no institutional interest in the litigation and merely 
wanted to settle her private rights.39 
Finally, the Court rejected Annette's argument that its holding was in-
consistent with the principle that bad faith is not required for a Section 
1021.5 claim.40 The Court found that attorney's fees could still be awarded 
against a person who adversely affects the public rights, even in good 
faith. 41 The Court also said that an award could be granted if the rights be-
ing violated were "somewhat intangible," and that a defendant paying the 
award can be an individual, corporation, or government entity. 42 
Holding 
The Court held that an award for attorney's fees under Section 1021.5 
may be imposed only on parties who have adversely affected the rights of 
the public or a substantial class of people, other than by raising an issue in 
the course of litigation over private matters that set a legal precedent ad-
versely affecting the public.43 
Legal Significance 
As a result of this decision, mere litigation of the rights of private par-
ties will not warrant a Section 1021.5 claim for attorney's fees, even if the 
litigation results in a precedent that could negatively affect the public. 
Therefore, attorneys must be more careful when accepting a case if they in-
tend to obtain their attorney's fees through a Section 1021.5 claim rather 
than from their clients. 
The Court reinforced the principle that a Section 1021.5 defendant 
may be a corporation, private individual, or government entity, but litiga-
tion alone would not warrant a claim unless the defendant had an institu-
tional interest in litigation that was determined to adversely affect public 
rights. 
38 ld. 
39 ld. 
40 ld. 
41 ld. 
42 ld. at 199-200. 
43 !d. at 200. 
